Dr M'zée Fula Ngenge: KP has failed to adapt to contemporary challenges

The United Nations-backed Kimberley Process (KP), established in 2003 to prevent conflict diamonds from entering the mainstream rough diamond market, has failed to adapt to contemporary challenges, such as state-sponsored violence and sophisticated smuggling networks, according to the African Diamond Council (ADC) and African Diamond Producers Association (ADPA) chairperson Dr M'zée Fula Ngenge.

He was reacting to an opinion by the Dubai Multi-Commodities Centre (DMCC) executive chairperson and chief executive Ahmed Bin Sulayem, which dismissed Budhai and Kumar's criticism of the diamond watchdog.

The two had identified pricing discrepancies, trade anomalies, and financial loopholes within the diamond industry.

The DMCC boss said critics had wrongly attributed the irregularities to the KP, misrepresenting its role and purpose.

Dr. Ngenge told Rough & Polished's Mathew Nyaungwa that the KP's limited mandate and inadequate enforcement mechanisms have allowed systemic issues, such as the laundering of conflict diamonds and financial irregularities, to continue unabated.

He stated that by framing the criticism as a fundamental misunderstanding of the KP's purpose, the composition effectively avoids addressing the substantive concerns raised by its critics.

What is your general assessment of the DMCC executive chairperson Ahmed Bin Sulayem’s defence of the Kimberley Process given the criticism levelled against the diamond watchdog by Budhai and Kumar?

It was an incredibly revealing perspective worthy of a response from the African Diamond Council (ADC). It is neither my intention to feign ignorance regarding the Kimberley Process (KP), nor to propagate outdated information about the certification scheme as it existed 15 years ago. It is only intellectually permissible and imperative to engage in constructive critique of initiatives that purport to serve as foundational mechanisms for industry advancement. It was the harsh critique from the Chairman of the Rapaport Group that fuelled the DMCC Chairman to go on the defensive of the KP and even so, I am a believer that such critique is essential for fostering accountability and driving meaningful reform. While the author of the article in question endeavours to mount a robust defence of the KP, the argumentation is marred by a litany of logical fallacies, unsubstantiated assertions and a dismissive tenor that ultimately undermines the KP's credibility. I detected that the commentary's tone came across as rather dismissive and defensive, portraying critics as emotional and misinformed, which could certainly apply. It describes criticisms of the KP as "emotional rhetoric" and accuses critics of seeking "easy headlines," which could also hold some truth to it. This framing is not only condescending in the eyes of African diamond-producing nations, but is also counterproductive, as it discourages meaningful dialogue and disregards the expertise of critics who have decades of experience in the field. The article's reliance on misrepresented propositions and unsubstantiated claims to dismiss legitimate criticisms is unacceptable and should be carefully re-examined by all interested parties.

What is your take on the argument that KP does not function as a "global financial watchdog" or an "anti-money laundering agency"?

The argument that critics of the KP often make by mischaracterising its role or expecting it to function as a "global financial watchdog" or an "anti-money laundering agency" is a quintessential example of what I would refer to as a “Strawman” argument (no pun intended), wherein the author misrepresents the position of critics to facilitate its rebuttal. Informed critics, including myself, do not advocate for the KP to assume such roles. Rather, the critique centres on the KP’s narrow mandate and its lack of robust enforcement mechanisms, which have permitted systemic issues—such as the laundering of conflict diamonds and financial irregularities—to persist unabated. By framing the criticism as a fundamental misunderstanding of the KP’s purpose, the composition effectively sidesteps engaging with the substantive concerns raised by its detractors. For instance, the author asserts, "Expecting the KP to solve challenges outside its jurisdiction is as illogical as blaming Interpol for failing to regulate corporate tax fraud." If truth be told, this constitutes a false equivalence of the highest order. Critics are not demanding that the KP regulate tax fraud; rather, we are calling for it to address the laundering of conflict diamonds, a responsibility that falls squarely within its purview. The KP’s failure to adapt to contemporary challenges—such as state-sponsored violence (e.g., the Russia-Ukraine conflict) and sophisticated smuggling networks (as evidenced in the very region where the column originates) —represents a valid and pressing critique that the article conspicuously ignores.

How factual is it that KP has succeeded in reducing the proportion of conflict diamonds in global trade to the current 1% from 15% in the 1990s?

While this statistic is frequently cited by KP proponents, its veracity is highly questionable. The 1% figure is derived from self-reported data provided by participating countries and industry stakeholders, rendering it inherently unreliable. Independent investigations conducted by organizations such as Global Witness and the African Diamond Council (ADC) have consistently demonstrated that so-called "conflict" diamonds continue to infiltrate the legal supply chain due to weak enforcement and systemic loopholes within the KP's certification framework. This is not a novel revelation; it is a well-documented issue that has been raised repeatedly by industry experts. Moreover, the KP's definition of "conflict diamonds" is anachronistic and excludes diamonds that fund state-sponsored violence or human rights abuses. For example, diamonds mined under regimes in Zimbabwe and Angola have been certified as "conflict-free" under the KP, despite overwhelming evidence of unspeakable human rights violations that urged effective initiatives such as "Operation Transparency" in the Republic of Angola. The article's assertion that the KP has been "effective in its mission" is therefore not only misleading but also indicative of a wilful disregard for the certification scheme’s systemic failures. The African Diamond Council (ADC) believes that voluntary acknowledgement of these failures is a prerequisite for any meaningful progress within the industry.

What is your reaction to the DMCC’s chairperson’s dismissal of concerns made over pricing discrepancies and financial irregularities?

His attempt to downplay concerns regarding pricing discrepancies and financial irregularities by arguing that these issues fall outside the KP's mandate is problematic. While it is true that the KP was not designed to regulate financial transactions, this perspective fails to recognise the interconnectedness of these issues with the KP's core mission. For instance, the undervaluation of diamonds at export points and the use of the Persian Gulf's major trade hub in for profit shifting create conduits for conflict diamonds to enter the legal supply chain. The article's defence of the domain known as "The Venice of the Gulf" as a "free trade hub" is particularly egregious, given the city's documented role in facilitating the putative laundering of African diamonds due to its lax regulatory environment. By dismissing these concerns as mere "market dynamics," the article perpetuates a narrative that absolves the KP of accountability for its governance and enforcement failures—a critique I have openly articulated for more than a decade and a half. The article also provides incomplete and misleading explanations for key issues such as the "disappearance" of diamonds in Mauritius and Zimbabwe's export surplus. In the case of Mauritius, the author claims that stockpiling is a "common industry practice" but fails to provide any empirical evidence to substantiate this claim. The African Diamond Council (ADC), which collects extensive data on diamond activities in Mauritius, has identified the leading actors responsible for this problematic channel and the ADC continues to carry out systematic inquiries. Similarly, the article dismisses concerns about Zimbabwe's export surplus by attributing it to "stockpile sales" without addressing the lack of transparency in how these stockpiles are managed. These explanations are not only inadequate but unfortunately serve to obfuscate the systemic issues that enable the infiltration of illicit diamonds into the legal supply chain. The article's suggestion that issues such as pricing fairness, taxation and financial crime should be addressed by financial regulators, rather than by the KP is what creates a false dichotomy. The KP's mission to prevent conflict diamonds from entering the legal supply chain is inextricably linked to these previously mentioned issues. For example, trade mispricing and undervaluation at export points are not merely financial crimes; they are also mechanisms for laundering conflict diamonds. By insisting that the KP should not address these issues, the article effectively absolves the KP of responsibility for the systemic failures that perpetuate the trade in conflict diamonds. I possess no apprehensiveness or uneasiness about being summed up as controversial, especially when I am being clear and concise or when I am encouraging the industry to demonstrate that it possesses the cogency to be truly ethical.

Why do you have problems with reliance on industry-led initiatives such as the Natural Diamond Council (NDC) and the Responsible Jewellery Council (RJC) to address traceability and ethical sourcing?

No one should ever deduce that a problem with an individual or an entity's reliance on industry-led initiatives such as the Natural Diamond Council (NDC) and the Responsible Jewellery Council (RJC) to address traceability exists unless their attempts for ethical sourcing have been confirmed as misguided. It should be understood that the ADC is welcoming to all industry bodies and open to collaborating with any initiative that has Africa as its focus. In addition, those who recognize and voluntarily profess and acknowledge that Africa is collectively the most dominant diamond producer on the planet will also be welcomed and treated fairly. Many of these initiatives lack powerful enforcement mechanisms and are often dominated by industry stakeholders with vested interests in maintaining the status quo. If African diamond-producing nations gravitate towards relying on such initiatives to complement the KP, then the ADC cannot view it as a solution, but merely a recipe for continued inaction.

What are the dangers of a narrow KP mandate and ‘outdated’ definitions?

It is safe to say that the KP's narrow mandate, outdated definitions and lack of enforcement mechanisms have allowed conflict diamonds to persist and financial irregularities to flourish. Rather than addressing these issues, the column is convincing in deflecting blame and perpetuating the KP's continued culture of unaccountability. There must be a more robust commitment to addressing the root causes of conflict and inequality in diamond-producing regions, particularly in Africa. The global diamond trade cannot afford to contribute to eroding consumer trust, simply because we failed to position a highly touted certification scheme to take on more responsibilities in efforts to address the most neglected industry issues.

What should KP do to remain relevant?

For the KP to remain relevant, it must evolve to address modern challenges, including state-sponsored violence, financial crimes as well as and the laundering or mechanisms of African diamonds that are not intended to return confiscated diamonds to their country of origin. This evolution requires not only a redefinition of its mandate but also a commitment to transparency, accountability and enforcement through traceability solutions that feature public blockchain (that is compatible with private blockchain technologies), certificates of origin and titles of ownership.

Mathew Nyaungwa, Editor-In-Chief, Rough & Polished