African Diamond Council threatens alternative certification system

The African Diamond Council (ADC) has launched a scathing critique of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) and issued a direct ultimatum to the incoming 2026 chair, India, demanding fundamental reforms or facing Africa's strategic withdrawal from the system.

The ADC declared the KPCS as suffering from "systemic shortfalls" and "irrelevance," prioritising "geopolitical convenience over justice."

Positioning India's tenure as a "definitive test of relevance," the ADC challenged the chair to lead "transformative reform" or preside over the KP's marginalisation. The council is also indicating a broader "strategic realignment" is underway in the diamond industry, moving away from legacy systems toward new alliances based on African sovereignty and ethical traceability.

The council outlined four non-negotiable demands for India's leadership: expanding the definition of "conflict diamonds" to include state-sponsored violence and human rights abuses; abolishing the consensus veto that paralyses decisions; establishing a guaranteed rotating chairmanship for African producing nations; and creating an independent, African-led monitoring body with investigative powers.

The ADC chairperson, Dr M’zèe Fula Ngenge, told Rough&Polished in an exclusive interview that failure to enact these reforms by the end of India's 2026 term would trigger a coordinated disengagement of African nations from the KP.

The council revealed it has already designed a framework for a new African-led certification system to replace it, asserting that Africa's role as the source of most of the world's natural diamonds would render the KP obsolete without its participation.

Below are excerpts from the interview.

 

Given your recent strong condemnation of India’s 2026 chairmanship, what specific, concrete actions do you expect from India during its term to address the KP’s “systemic shortfalls,” beyond the four demands listed in your ultimatum?

The African Diamond Council’s (ADC) recent analysis of India’s incoming chairmanship highlights systemic deficiencies within the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) itself, which is an apparatus that often appears designed more to perpetuate its own existence than to deliver meaningful oversight. As a founding member and now Chair, India assumes this role at a pivotal moment, with expectations for leadership at an unprecedented high.

The ADC regards India as an indispensable partner and values the enduring strength of its ties. Our consistent organisational support extends to all diamond centers committed to ensuring Africa realises its full economic potential. Any critique of the 2026 Chairmanship pertains exclusively to the structural weaknesses of the KPCS framework and is in no way a reflection on the Republic of India.

India is uniquely positioned to leverage its chairmanship for transformative reform. As a preeminent trading hub and trusted global interlocutor, it can address core systemic failures. We urge a focus on critical imperatives, beginning with championing the long-stalled expansion of the "conflict diamond" definition beyond rebel-controlled rough to include diamonds tainted by state-sponsored violence, human rights abuses, and severe environmental degradation. This requires building diplomatic consensus by framing modernisation as essential for the scheme’s credibility and survival.

Concurrently, India should drive the adoption of secure, interoperable digital traceability systems to track and trace a diamond’s journey from mine to export. Its IT expertise positions it to pilot such solutions, closing critical transparency gaps. To strengthen oversight, India must advocate for robust, independent peer-review missions with capacity for unannounced assessments, moving beyond the current politically constrained model.

Crucially, India must restore the KP’s tripartite ethos by ensuring meaningful participation of civil society and industry in all working groups, reversing their recent marginalisation. Launching an initiative to formalise and support artisanal mining communities would link compliance with sustainable development, improving livelihoods and securing revenue streams.

For enduring impact, India should propose procedural reforms, such as super-majority voting on critical issues, to break decision-making deadlocks. It can also lay the groundwork for a small, permanent technical secretariat to ensure institutional continuity. By leveraging its diplomatic capital from forums like the G20 and mandating exemplary due diligence within its own industry, India can set a powerful precedent.

The ultimate objective for this chairmanship must be to irreversibly initiate a concrete reform process. This entails establishing a clear roadmap for definition expansion and a commitment to a powerful digital traceability solution. Such action would transform India’s tenure into a catalytic moment, securing the Kimberley Process’s future relevance and integrity.

The organisation you lead described the departures of several key industry figures in 2025 as "interconnected maneuvers within a broader, strategic realignment." Can you elaborate on the nature of this realignment and how the African Diamond Council (ADC) is positioned to influence this new "architecture of influence"?

The ADC acknowledges India’s assumption of the Kimberley Process Chairmanship at a pivotal moment for the certification scheme, whose credibility is fundamentally eroded. As the principal beneficiary of the current architecture, India is uniquely positioned to transcend ceremonial stewardship and enact transformative leadership. We urge India to leverage its chair, not to perpetuate a failing status quo, but to become the essential agent of restoration, accountability, and reform within the KP. The core mandate has been subverted by operational complacency and the systemic sidelining of African producing states. India must officially recognise, within KP fora and public discourse, the legitimacy crisis arising from this continued marginalisation.

Concretely, India must formally invite, fund, and guarantee a standing platform within KP meetings for African civil society, labor unions, and artisanal mining associations to provide direct testimony. Furthermore, India should sponsor an independent, expert review of the KP’s governance structure, particularly its chairmanship model and consensus procedures. To demonstrate leadership in practice, India should launch a government-backed pilot program for its diamond companies to implement enhanced due diligence and traceability protocols that validate the human rights indicators long advocated by the ADC. While consensus rules remain, India can insist that any objection to reform discussions be formally recorded and substantiated in official minutes, rendering obstruction transparent and politically accountable.

The ADC challenges India to redefine its chairmanship as an exercise in deliberate and constructive disruption. This requires legitimising the reform agenda by forcing critical truths into official processes, challenging obstructive mechanisms, and utilising India’s trade dominance to model higher standards. Inaction would not merely maintain the status quo; it would serve as a formal ratification of the KP’s irrelevance, presiding over the irrevocable dissolution of its remaining credibility. The moment for decisive leadership is now.

The ADC stated that African officials supporting "legacy systems" will face "institutional extinction in 2026." What does this process look like in practice, and what new structures or alliances is the ADC fostering to replace them?

The persistence of African officials within antiquated, non-African diamond governance frameworks is an institutional dead end. This path leads not to reform, but to irrelevance. As legitimacy and influence are strategically diverted from legacy systems like the Kimberley Process (KP), those clinging to them will find their roles systematically marginalised.

This transformation is already underway, signaled by the strategic departure of key industry and KP figures in 2025. This exodus is less a changing of the guard than a necessary purification, which is a clearing of the sclerotic foundations of a compromised system. Officials who remain intractably aligned with these receding powers will see their standing erode. Their defense of the status quo will be recognised, not as pragmatism, but as complicity in a neo-colonial structure that prioritises extraction over African empowerment.

The objective is a strategic reclamation to engineer the controlled implosion of this outdated architecture from within. By withdrawing the essential resource of African consent, the KP will be exposed as a hollow mechanism whose operation has always depended on the very allegiances now being revoked.

To supplant these legacy systems, new alliances are forming around the principles of African sovereignty and radical reform. While advocating for a fundamentally transformed KP, these efforts are equally prepared to establish a full alternative. The demands are unequivocal: expanding the definition of conflict diamonds to include terrorism and systemic human rights abuses; abolishing the consensus veto that paralyses multilateral decision-making; instituting a guaranteed, rotating chairmanship for producing nations; and establishing an independent, African-led monitoring body with unequivocal investigative authority.

In this consequential moment, the re-emergence of the Angola-based intergovernmental organisation is critical. The association now faces a definitive choice, which is either, to perpetuate its legacy of reactive facilitation or embrace its potential as a central governing authority. They can no longer allow Africa’s diamonds to be swapped for boxes of dates, and association’s actions have clearly revealed both, their true identity as well as the interests they really serve. The association must cease enabling their own exploitation and complicity in the degradation of the African diamond industry by those who are listed at the top of ADC’s industry misconduct or blacklist.

The logical progression is for the intergovernmental organisation headquartered in Angola to formalise its operations and assume the role of Secretariat for a comprehensive, continent-wide certification framework. This must be undertaken independently, without direction from parties whose interests are misaligned with those of Africa and/or by those who contribute to fundamental misguidance in the decision-making of the KP observer.

This is a decisive test of political will. To remain on the sidelines is an abdication of sovereignty, which is a preference for the comfort of assent over the burdens of authority. Failure to act would historicise the Luanda-based association, not as a visionary organisation, but as a performative entity that chose accommodation over self-determined governance. The industry’s future will be built by those who wield transformative power, not by those who seek validation from a fading order.

If the KP does not enact your demanded reforms, what is the ADC’s concrete strategy for disengaging from or replacing the certification scheme? Are you actively developing an alternative African-led certification system?

The ADC’s position on the Kimberley Process (KP) is clear. We have concluded our phase of constructive engagement and no longer consider incremental reform viable.

Should the KP fail to enact fundamental reforms by 2026, the ADC will initiate a strategic withdrawal of Africa’s political and institutional legitimacy from the scheme. As the source of the majority of the world’s natural diamonds, Africa’s coordinated disengagement will render the KP obsolete.

We have already designed the framework for its successor, which is an African-led certification system based on non-negotiable principles. These include a modernised definition of conflict diamonds, a reformed governance model without veto power, a guaranteed rotating African chair, and an independent monitoring body with full investigative authority.

A supportive international coalition, including critical partners in India, stands ready to endorse this new standard. The 2026 KP Plenary represents a final opportunity for meaningful change. The outcome will determine whether the KP is substantively reformed under India’s chairmanship or superseded by a more credible, equitable system.

Our path forward is definitive. If reform is rejected, the ADC will immediately proceed to formally establish an independent monitoring body and implement a new certification protocol. We are not negotiating for a seat at the table; we are building a new one.

How does the ADC plan to mobilise "justice-minded nations, NGOs, and consumers" to "disaffirm this ongoing façade," and what are your key performance indicators for success in this advocacy campaign?

If necessary, the ADC shall execute a disciplined mobilisation campaign to dismantle the Kimberley Process's (KP) failed status quo and establish a new, legitimate governance framework for the global diamond trade. Our strategy shall employ measured, escalating actions designed to irrevocably shift the political and market landscape.

It begins with a definitive public declaration to demarcate allegiance and attract global partners united in rejecting the KP’s fundamental failures. This will be followed by deploying a targeted strategic narrative to consolidate distinct constituencies: to justice-oriented states, by exposing the KP as a neocolonial apparatus that systematically undermines African sovereignty; to NGOs and civil society, by detailing its documented complicity in human rights abuses and systemic violence; and to consumers, by branding the KP certificate a fraudulent “ethical façade” to shatter confidence and catalyze buyer activism.

The core of our position is a clear, four-point reform agenda that serves as the sole benchmark for legitimate KP progress: a modernised definition of conflict diamonds; a reformed governance structure eliminating the consensus veto; a guaranteed rotating African chairmanship; and the establishment of an independent, African-led monitoring body with investigative authority. Direct accountability will be applied to the incoming 2026 Chair, India, whose tenure will be judged solely on enacting these demands, establishing its stewardship as the KP’s definitive test of relevance.

Should substantive reform be obstructed, the campaign will seek to formally withdraw Africa’s political consent from the KP, compelling participants and NGOs to downgrade their engagement. This action is designed to catalyse the development of an autonomous African framework. Success will be measured by key performance indicators tracking both, the disruption of the status quo and the concrete advancement of our agenda, with the objective of securing a core decision-making role for the ADC within a restructured authority.

The ADC has taken time to cultivate a committed coalition, including significant support within India and key markets beyond Africa, prepared to facilitate demand for diamonds certified under a new, ethical standard. While the groundwork for an African-led system is actively being laid, the formal announcement of a fully constituted alternative will be strategically timed; its blueprint is embedded within our non-negotiable demands.

This is a strategy of deliberate, principled realignment. The ADC is not negotiating for a seat at the table and are more interested in constructing a new one on African terms.

You demand a guaranteed rotating chairmanship for African producing nations. What specific governance model do you propose to ensure this rotation is effective and doesn’t simply transfer the KP’s current dysfunctions to a new chair?

The African Diamond Council (ADC) shall present a comprehensive, non-negotiable reform package for the Kimberley Process (KP). This proposal will constitute a structural overhaul, framed as a sovereign principle, rather than a mere administrative adjustment.

Its central pillar is the institution of a guaranteed rotating chairmanship, to commence with Botswana—a logical and symbolic decision given the location of the Permanent Secretariat in Gaborone. This ensures the African voice is central to governance, not peripheral.

However, the efficacy of this chairmanship is expressly contingent upon the concurrent adoption of the ADC’s other three demands, which are designed to dismantle the current dysfunctional architecture. The rotating chair is not a standalone concession, but a keystone of justice and practical efficacy within a fundamentally reformed system.

Therefore, the ADC model is sequential and conditional: the existing system must first be reformed. Simply transferring the chairmanship under the present structure would merely perpetuate its failings. Africa will assume a leadership role at the helm of a new, accountable KP, not the outdated one.

ADC accused the KP of prioritising "geopolitical convenience over justice." Can you provide specific examples from the past few years where consensus was used to veto progress on issues directly affecting African mining communities?

The Kimberley Process (KP) has demonstrably prioritised geopolitical convenience over justice by systematically misusing its consensus rule. This is evidenced by a pattern of veto actions that have obstructed progress on critical issues directly impacting communities in nations that mine diamonds.

First, the KP’s core definition of “conflict diamonds” remains frozen as of 2003, restricted solely to gems financing rebel movements against recognised governments. Proposals from African nations, civil society, and member states to expand this definition to encompass diamond-funded terrorism, state-sponsored violence, and human rights abuses that are documented in contexts from Zimbabwean artisanal mining to regions where smuggling finances jihadist groups, have been consistently vetoed. A single member or small bloc can thus block reform, permitting diamonds linked to modern atrocities to enter global markets with a “conflict-free” label.

Second, the consensus rule paralyses the KP’s peer review and enforcement mechanisms. Requests for mandatory, independent investigations into complex and non-compliant diamond flows, such as those from the Central African Republic, where violence and embargo violations persist, are routinely obstructed. This veto power enables members to shield allies or themselves from scrutiny, leaving smuggling channels and systemic abuses in African mining communities unaddressed.

Third, consensus has been weaponized to veto structural reforms aimed at granting nations equitable governance. Proposals to establish a guaranteed rotating African chairmanship or to elevate the Luanda-based intergovernmental organisation from observer to decision-maker have been repeatedly dismissed. Consequently, the KP perpetuates a governance model where consumer and trading blocs dictate terms, sidelining African priorities such as formalising artisanal mining, ensuring fair revenue retention, and addressing localised violence.

Finally, the threat of veto stifles foundational discourse on transformative measures like mandatory technological traceability. Opposition from major trading hubs often prevents such issues from even reaching the formal agenda, confining progress to voluntary industry initiatives. This allows diamonds from abusive or conflict-affected African mining sites to be laundered into legal chains, undermining ethical producers in nations like Botswana and Namibia, while denying justice to communities whose diamonds are devalued by commingling with stones of tainted origin.

The cumulative effect is clear that the consensus rule, as currently deployed, sustains an architecture of impunity and institutional inertia, directly contradicting the KP’s founding mandate.

Regarding your demand for an independent, African-led monitoring body: how would this body be funded, structured, and insulated from the very political pressures you say have crippled the KP?

The African Diamond Council’s call for an independent, African-led monitoring mechanism stands as a definitive institutional response to the systemic failures of the Kimberley Process. The ADC shall establish a fiscally autonomous structure, funded primarily by selected members of the African Union via a dedicated levy and jointly administered by the ADC and entities in Africa that are looking to align in the same manner. This will be supplemented by strategic partnerships with aligned non-governmental organisations and supportive nations outside the traditional diamond trade axis.

The body will be constituted and governed by African stakeholders, operating entirely outside the KP’s administrative framework as an independent investigative entity equipped with field capacity and a public reporting mandate. Its design is synergistic with the ADC’s demand for a guaranteed African KP Chairmanship, creating a counterweight system to rebalance global diamond governance. The mechanism is explicitly architected to avoid the political obstructions that incapacitated the KP, particularly the consensus veto rule. Its mandate will prioritise African security and human dignity, which addresses terrorism, human rights abuses, and violence against miners, shifting focus from the KP’s perceived emphasis on trade facilitation and geopolitical expediency. Accountability will be directed toward justice-minded civil society, the African public, and the international community through transparent reporting, deriving authority from evidence-based advocacy rather than diplomatic negotiation.

In essence, the ADC proposes not a pre-2027 reform of the Kimberley Process, but a parallel and purpose-built institution. It is designed to enforce the supply-chain accountability that the KP has structurally failed to deliver, moving beyond declarative campaigns to establish actionable, African-led oversight.

Beyond the potential for "presiding over the funeral" of the KP, what is your realistic projection for the scheme in 2026 and beyond? Do you foresee a formal dissolution, a marginalisation in favour of other standards, or a last-minute reform spurred by your ultimatum?

The ADC anticipates that by the end of 2026, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) will face marginalisation and effective irrelevance, rather than formal dissolution. We project the scheme will persist formally while being progressively circumvented by emergent power structures and more rigorous standards. Our call for radical reform, which include the abolition of the consensus veto and the establishment of a guaranteed African chairmanship, serves as a definitive public test of the KP’s viability. We do not expect the scheme to meet these demands. This strategic position allows for a clear, justified narrative should the 2026 chairmanship fail to catalyze meaningful change, thereby accelerating the KP’s decline and legitimising a full strategic realignment by African producers. A fundamental shift in the architecture of influence is already underway, signaled by the departure of key industry leaders from legacy systems.

The KPCS stands at an undeniable crossroads. Its narrow, antiquated definition of conflict diamonds fails to address contemporary ethical imperatives, including systemic human rights abuses, environmental degradation, and governance failures. Looking ahead, three pathways emerge. The first, formal dissolution, is unlikely but high-impact. It would trigger severe market fragmentation, with vulnerable producer states facing revenue shocks and necessitating a crisis-driven launch of a Pan-African certification framework. The second, and most probable pathway, is gradual marginalisation. As major retailers, financiers, and jurisdictions adopt stricter due diligence protocols, the KP will be reduced to a baseline customs document. This will create a two-tier reality, bifurcating African producers between those capable of meeting higher standards and those relegated to commodity-grade sales, thereby exacerbating continental inequities. The third pathway is substantive reform spurred by a collective ultimatum. While a unified standard could restore legitimacy, any reform must be inseparable from a robust, funded mechanism for capacity building. Without genuine support for artisanal sectors and weaker institutions, such reform would be hollow and unsustainable.

In response, Africa must adopt a unified, proactive, and pragmatic stance. We reject passive subservience to outdated structures. Instead, we must forge a common African position on diamond governance that champions ethical evolution while demanding developmental support and equitable market access. We must immediately bolster national capacities in traceability and due diligence, treating beyond-KP compliance as an inevitable market reality. Within the KP, we must strategically leverage collective influence to pursue feasible, fair reforms with timelines that account for varied national capacities. Finally, we must develop a credible contingency blueprint for a regional African certification mechanism to safeguard market access under all scenarios.

Our objective is not to preserve the KP in amber, but to steward a responsible transition for the African diamond industry, which is one that protects revenues, supports communities, and meets the legitimate ethical demands of the global market. Whether through a reformed KP or new architectures, Africa must lead in shaping the standards that govern its resources, ensuring they drive sustainable development rather than vulnerability. Our legacy will be determined by the foresight and unity we demonstrate at this pivotal moment.

Given the leadership upheaval you note and the crisis of legitimacy in the KP, what are the ADC’s projections for the global diamond industry’s structure and consumer confidence in 2026? How will this "strategic realignment" manifest in market dynamics, especially for African producers?

The ADC has strategically designated 2026 as a pivotal inflection point. Through a calculated campaign it terms "strategic realignment," the consortium is actively challenging the existing governance framework, seeking to replace symbolic African representation with substantive authority over production and trade.

This coincides with a broader, irreversible sectoral transformation. By 2026, the centralised, certification-dependent model will give way to a fragmented ecosystem driven by technology and brand-specific trust. Generic "natural diamond" appeal will continue to erode, particularly among younger consumers, as lab-grown alternatives expand.

Future confidence will reside not in broad industry seals, but in verifiable provenance and compelling ethical narratives attached to specific brands and mine-to-market programmes. The market will irrevocably bifurcate: a commoditised segment for smaller stones, and a high-margin, story-driven segment for premium gems with impeccable provenance.

Outcomes will be starkly uneven. Nations with modern, large-scale operations producing high-value gemstones, such as Botswana and Angola, will retain essential roles, provided they aggressively advance in-country beneficiation and fiscal reform to capture greater value. Conversely, regions dependent on artisanal and small-scale mining face acute marginalisation due to traceability challenges, which risk diverting production into opaque channels and exacerbating the sector’s legitimacy deficit. The imperative for all producers is clear: become a low-cost supplier in a commoditising segment, or build vertically integrated, ethically branded pipelines directly to the luxury consumer.

Within this context, asset vulnerability is acute. Mature, high-cost underground mines in unstable jurisdictions, along with operations yielding predominately small, low-quality stones uncompetitive with lab-grown diamonds, face the highest closure risk. Mines in sanctioned or non-compliant jurisdictions may find themselves isolated from major markets. Resilience will be concentrated in modern, high-volume assets producing large, gem-quality stones, and those already aligned with transparent, ethically branded supply chains.

The strategic calculus around De Beers further illustrates the sector’s complexity. While its unmatched brand, distribution, and marketing apparatus remain valuable, acquiring this legacy giant in a contracting market entails substantial liabilities: legacy costs, a capital-intensive global structure, and the strategic weight of its historical role. A full acquisition by a single nation is both improbable and inadvisable, representing an untenable concentration of risk.

A more plausible scenario for 2026 involves a consortium bid, perhaps led by an alliance of nations or a partnership between a sovereign wealth fund and private capital. The most likely outcome, however, is a renegotiated strategic partnership among existing stakeholders. A producer like Botswana may well secure greater equity or more favorable terms to extract enhanced value from its resources, but it is unlikely to seek ownership of the entire global sales behemoth during a structural downturn. The path forward lies not in simple nationalisation, but in rebalanced, mutually accountable partnerships.

Mathew Nyaungwa, Editor-In-Chief, Rough&Polished